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House of Representatives

BEYOND THE FREEZE: A NEW APPROACH TO MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. GORE. Mr. Speaker, for many years, arms control has been the province of a handful of specialists in government and in the academic world. By and large this small group has decided what was to be considered feasible in arms control from a theoretical point of view, and it comprised judge and jury for the finished products; that is, arms control agreements worked out with the Soviet Union and brought forward to the Senate for advice and consent.

The failure of the SALT process has often been attributed to extraneous events. For example, many now say the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan made it impossible for the Carter administration to submit the treaty to the Senate.

But in a larger sense, the SALT process may be said to have failed even without help from the outside. It was clear that the treaty, whatever its merits or demerits, had no broad constituency in our country. True, it had a number of lukewarm supporters, who were prepared to argue that it was better than nothing, but it had very few who were really willing to go to the mat for it. Certainly the people who have always distrusted arms control and who want to try to buy and deploy our way to safety did not like it, and even the arms controllers themselves were unenthusiastic.

The treaty we and the Soviets had devised certainly would have limited strategic arms, but only at enormously higher numbers of weapons. By the time we and the Soviets would have reached levels of deployed strategic warheads, as permitted by the treaty, the United States would have gone from about 8,946 in 1980, to approximately 13,438 in 1989, and the Soviets from about 7,273 in 1980, to approximately 15,560 in 1989.

Now we have a new administration which wishes to greatly accelerate the rate at which the United States deploys new strategic weapons, which is manifestly doubtful about the value of arms control for national security, and which appears to want to dangle prospects of arms control mainly for purposes of linkage and leverage against the Soviets.

As a result, people all across this country are becoming alarmed. They see on the one hand rhetoric about arms control, and on the other hand, massive real resources going into programs for new weapons. They are concerned that the direction in which we are headed is only too clear: an unlimited, ungovernable competition with the Soviet Union to build new strategic weapons; vast sums expended for what would in fact turn out to be diminished safety in the world.

This foreboding is the stuff of which grassroots movements are made. From the vantage point of the Congress, we can already see that arms control is in fact moving fast into the political arena. The conventions and

concerns of "academic" or "professional" arms controllers—their appreciation for the niceties and nuances—are not likely to make much of an impression on the kind of debate we seem to be heading into.

There are calls for dramatic and allegedly simple solutions—total freezes, drastic reductions on fixed timetables, and the like—which have become the program of an emerging political coalition in this country. To an extent, this is a positive development: The people are telling their Government to get moving with meaningful arms control discussions. But there is also a danger that reasoned consideration of this country's real security needs will be impatiently overlooked and that important factors about how the real world operates will be blithely ignored.

Recently, numerous Members of the House and Senate sponsored a rather carefully worded resolution, which calls for a lot of changes in our approach to arms control. That resolution apparently means quite different things to different people: to Members who supported it, and to the public at large.

We have an obligation and a political need to go further than giving nominal support to resolutions such as these. We owe the people an effort on our part to think carefully and deeply about the implications of such proposals, to advance suggestions as to how, in detail and in practice, we might actually shape a new program for strategic arms control.

For the past 14 months, since being assigned to the Intelligence Committee, I have worked hard to develop an understanding of our dilemma and our options. In a long series of briefings with arms control experts and in a series of breakfast seminars on this issue which I have sponsored with the Library of Congress, I have developed the conviction that this problem is not a Gordian knot. It can be solved with patience and understanding and commitment. And of course, it must be solved.

What I am submitting today has been developed with the assistance of individuals at the Congressional Research Service and other experts in and out of government. I wanted to know whether it was possible to get at the single most important strategic problem we have—the vulnerability of land-based ICBM's—by means of a vigorous and innovative arms control concept. I wondered if we could somehow focus our efforts on this problem, and I stipulated the conditions to be respected in the detailed analysis:

The objective would not be reductions per se, although this was an important consideration—but reductions of those systems which contribute the most to strategic instability, and to the risk of nuclear war by reflex, rather than on purpose. This meant doing something drastic about one particular system: land-based, MIRV'd ICBM's. My suggestion was to explore what would happen if both sides agreed to get rid of such ICBM's, replacing them with new single warhead ICBM's on both sides. If this could be done, without at the same time disturbing the strategic balance at some

other point, we might emerge with more stable and secure arrangements—but not at the cost of deploying enormously costly mobile systems, or an ABM system to defend them.

I am now convinced that we could indeed accomplish these objectives, and that we could do so with a modified "moratorium" in selected areas and actual reductions in other areas. Here is the outline of the proposal:

First, a moratorium for 4 to 5 years, during which each side would agree to do nothing that would add to the number of deployed, MIRV'd ICBM's, or to increase their accuracy. During this time, however, both sides would be able to continue research and development of certain new kinds of weapons: A step which we have to take as a hedge against the collapse of efforts to negotiate the vital second phase of reduction with the Soviets.

Second, an agreement which would begin a prolonged readjustment of strategic forces on both sides. At the end of this period, first, neither side would have MIRV'd ICBM's, though they would have deployed new single RV ICBM's in equal numbers; second, no other system—such as the SLBM—would have been deployed with hard target characteristics; third, overall numbers of deployed launchers and weapons would have declined substantially; fourth, the process of adjustment for both sides would be prolonged so as to be realistically in tune with replacement cycles for existing weapons—allowing each side time to amortize their expenses in deploying those weapons, and to make the necessary changes in the shape of their overall strategic deterrents.

As a direct consequence of this approach, the window of vulnerability would have been closed through arms control, and strategic stability enhanced. As an enormously important byproduct of this approach, the total destructiveness of weapons in the hands of either side would also have been cut to a fraction of the numbers that SALT II would have allowed.

Arms control goes beyond the technical questions of who shall reduce what. When we and the Soviets sit down to talk about strategic arms control, we are affirming a basic—even a transcendent—fact: That nuclear weapons are indeed "different." We and the Soviets must make clear to ourselves and to each other that we recognize that nuclear weapons really mean; that they could bring to an end both the values and the people that both sides are seeking to promote and protect.

The grassroots movement we are experiencing in this country is based on the fear that neither side truly appreciates the odds, that specialists and ideologists on both sides are thinking that a nuclear war would somehow be winnable. The people are demanding that their political leaders show that they understand what the specialists may not, and that these leaders will reach out and grasp their responsibilities.

We can do so, Mr. Speaker, and we must.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

While engaging in START and through December 31, 1986, the Soviet Union and the United States will agree to a moratorium under the following terms:

Additional ICBM launchers to those currently existing will not be deployed.

ICBM launchers with single or multiple reentry vehicles will not be converted to launchers for MIRVs.

The number of MIRVs on currently deployed ICBM types will not be increased.

Further testing of currently deployed ICBM and SLBM types is not allowed.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are allowed to develop, test (no more than 25 times), and deploy one new single-warhead ICBM type, provided this new ICBM does not have a "bus" to dispense MIRVs, replaces an existing ICBM, and has a throw-weight not greater than that of the Soviet Union's SS-19 ICBM.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are allowed to develop and test, but not produce or deploy, a new MIRVed ICBM and a new MIRVed SLBM, as hedges against failure to achieve a strategic offensive arms reduction agreement.

Starting January 1, 1987, the Soviet Union and the United States will proceed to reduce the aggregate number of their strategic offensive weapons launchers (launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers) to an aggregated ceiling no larger than the lowest ceiling agreed to in the SALT II Treaty. By the end of 1987, neither nation may have more than 2,250 strategic offensive weapons launchers, of which no more than 1,080 may be ICBM launchers and 120 heavy bombers equipped with an aggregate total of not more than 2400 long-range (more than 600 kilometers range) air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

To reduce the possibility and incentive of the Soviet and U.S. ICBM forces from engaging in a counterforce attack, starting January 1, 1987 the Soviet Union will begin to retire launchers for its MIRVed SS-18, SS-19, and SS-17 ICBMs (in that order), followed in the same order by launchers for the single-warhead versions of these ICBMs. Concurrent to Soviet retirement of these ICBM launchers, the United States will retire some launchers for the Poseidon SLBM and launchers for the Minuteman III ICBM (in that order). Each nation will retire at least 80 launchers per annum until all the launchers for the SS-18, SS-19, SS-17, and Minuteman III ICBMs have been retired. However, the retirement of launchers for the Minuteman III will take place after the Soviet Union retires 250 launchers for the MIRVed version of the SS-18.

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL

Currently, the numbers and types of SLBMs being deployed is routinely verified by observing the SSBN in which the SLBM is being introduced. Overhead photography and other means of detection are used.

The accuracy improvements of ICBMs and SLBMs is verified from intercepted test telemetry, and by tracking the missiles during operational tests.

The performance and characteristics of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs is primarily determinable from data intercepted when the missiles are tested.

Verification that ICBM or SLBM launchers are being dismantled is made from overhead photography.

The deployment of silo-based ICBMs is verified from overhead photography.

Silos containing MIRVed ICBMs have characteristics (signatures) that are distinct

from silos containing single-warhead ICBMs.

Bomber aircraft equipped with ALCMs have observable differences from bombers not equipped to carry these weapons.

The numbers and types of heavy bombers deployed is verified by photographic surveillance of the aircraft production facilities and bomber operational bases.

There is no indisputable method to verify that the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) is not being increased in a currently deployed MIRVed ICBM which has been tested to carry a higher number of RVs. The U.S. may not be able to detect the conversion of 8-MIRV SS-18 ICBMs to the 10-MIRV configuration. However, if the conversion continues, approximately 350 additional RVs would be added to the Soviet ICBM force. The gain to the Soviets in continuing the conversion of the MIRVed SS-18s would be of short duration, because under the terms of the proposed START the MIRVed SS-18s will be the first ICBMs to be retired.

Significant violations in the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and bombers deployed would be readily detected. Also, the Soviets would not be able to attain a comfortable degree of confidence in the performance of additional accuracy improvements to their ICBMs and SLBMs without thorough, testing of the whole missile system.

U.S. STRATEGIC PROGRAMS UNDER THIS PROPOSAL

Reductions

No hard-site ABM defense needed.

No procurement and deployment of the M-X ICBM, and no construction for basing the M-X.

No procurement, production, and deployment of the Trident II SLBM, but continue its development.

No implementation of ballistic missile accuracy improvements (such as stellar-inertial system for Trident I SLBMs).

No deployment of larger or more lethal reentry vehicle warheads.

Retirement of the Titan II and Minuteman III ICBM force.

Phased retirement of the B-52D, B-52H, and B-52G bombers.

Reduction in the number of B-52 aircraft that would be modified to carry ALCMs. Without START, more than 120 B-52 bombers would be converted to ALCM carriers.

Curtailment in the total number of tanker aircraft needed to support the strategic bomber force.

Phased retirement of the Lafayette-class (Poseidon and Trident I) SSBNs from the strategic forces, and their conversion to attack submarines.

Curtailment in the total number of Ohio-class (Trident) SSBNs that would probably be deployed without START.

Curtailment in the total number of ALCMs that would be deployed. Without START, more than 120 B-52 bombers would be converted to ALCM carriers.

Curtailment in the total number of SRAMs or other short-range attack missiles that would be deployed. Without START, more than 100 penetrating bombers, armed with SRAMs or other short-range missiles, would probably be deployed.

New Deployments

630 single-warhead (without a "bus") ICBMs (denoted in tables as MX-2), with 28 new additional ICBM silos (to provide a total of 1,080 launchers), would need to be constructed.

100 B-1B bomber aircraft (initially tasked to be penetrating bombers, and later phased to ALCM carriers, replacing B-52G CMCs, as the more advanced STEALTH aircraft assume penetrating role), or alternatively 100 new CMCs.

100 STEALTH penetrating bombers or 100 advanced CMCs.

PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS UNDER THIS PROPOSAL

Reductions

No expansion of current ABM capabilities. No deployment of a mobile ICBM with a hard-target capability.

No construction for basing of a mobile ICBM.

No deployment of larger or more lethal reentry vehicle warheads.

No deployment of a SLBM with hard-target capability.

No implementation of accuracy improvements to existing ICBMs and SLBMs.

Retirement of the SS-11 ICBM force.

Retirement of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs a few years earlier than anticipated.

Retirement of Yankee I SSBNs from the strategic forces, and their conversion to attack submarines.

Retirement of SS-N-6 SLBMs on Yankee I SSBNs.

Retirement of Golf III SSB and all Hotel II SSBNs.

Retirement of SS-N-5 SLBM on Hotel II SSBNs.

Retirement of the TU-95 Bear and Mya-4 Bison bombers.

Retirement of the Kangaroo air-launched missile.

New Deployments

1,020 new single-warhead ICBMs (denoted in tables as SS-X), with throw-weight not to exceed that of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM.

120 new heavy bombers (denoted in tables as TU-X SWL).

Replacement of Yankee I SSBNs with a new 16-launcher SSBN (denoted in tables as SSBN-X).

Continued deployment of Typhoon SSBNs.

Continued deployment of SS-N-20 SLBMs on Typhoon SSBNs.

Deployment of SS-N-17 SLBMs (or other existing type) on new SSBN (denoted in tables as SSBN-X) replacing the Yankee I SSBNs.

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WARHEAD LOADINGS USED IN PROJECTIONS

Unless otherwise specified in the tables, all other ballistic missiles except the following are estimated or projected to carry a single independently-targetable reentry vehicle:

Soviet: SS-N-20, 10 MIRVs; SS-N-18, 7 MIRVs.

United States: Minuteman III, 3 MIRVs; Poseidon, 9 MIRVs (average); Trident I, 8 MIRVs (average).

Bombers weapon loadings are estimated and projected to be as follows:

Soviet: TU-95 Bear, 1 AS-3 Kangaroo missile or four bombs; Mya-4 Bison, 2 bombs; TU-X SWL, 12 ALCMs (average) + 4 bombs.

United States: B-52D, 2 SRAMs + 4 bombs; B-52G/H, 4 SRAMs + 4 bombs; B-52G CMC, 12 ALCMs + 4 SRAMs + 4 bombs through 1985. Thereafter, a total of 348 ALCMs added per year (replacing SRAMs and bombs) until all B-52G CMCs are equipped with 20 ALCMs; B-1B, 8 SRAMs + 4 bombs; B-1B CMC, 24 ALCMs; STEALTH, 8 SRAMs + 4 bombs.

PROJECTED SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| ICBM designation | | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| SS-18 (10 MIRVs) | | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-18 (8 MIRVs) | | 175 | 175 | 175 | 175 | 175 | 170 | 90 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-19 (6 MIRVs) | | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 230 | 150 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-17 (4 MIRVs) | | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 110 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-18 (single) | | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-19 (single) | | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-17 (single) | | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 20 | 0 |
| SS-13 | | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| SS-17 | | 518 | 518 | 468 | 418 | 368 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-X | | 0 | 0 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 360 | 440 | 520 | 600 | 680 | 760 | 840 | 920 | 1,000 | 1,020 |
| Total | | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |

PROJECTED U.S. ICBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| ICBM designation | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| Minuteman III (MX-12A) | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 220 | 140 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Minuteman III (MX-12) | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 230 | 150 | 70 | 0 | 0 | |
| Minuteman II | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | |
| Titan II | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 45 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| MX-2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 34 | 80 | 160 | 240 | 320 | 400 | 480 | 560 | 630 | 630 | |
| Total | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | |

ESTIMATED TYPE AND NUMBER OF SOVIET AND U.S. SLBM LAUNCHERS IN SSBs AND SSBNS

Soviet SSBs and SSBNs are believed to have the following type and number of SLBM launchers: Typhoon, 20 SS-N-20;

Delta III, 16 SS-N-18; Delta II, 16 SS-N-8; Delta I, 12 SS-N-8; Yankee II, 12 SS-N-17; Yankee I, 16 SS-N-6; SSBN-X (projected), 16 SS-N-17 (or other existing SLBM); Hotel III, 6 SS-N-8; Hotel II, 3 SS-N-5; Golf III, 6 SS-N-8.

U.S. SSBNs have the following type and number of SLBM launchers: Lafayette-class, 16 Poseidon or 16 Trident I; Ohio-class, 24 Trident I.

PROJECTED SOVIET SSB/SSBN INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| SSB/SSBN CLASS (SLBM type) | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| Typhoon (SS-N-20) | 1 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Delta III (SS-N-18) | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Delta II (SS-N-8) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Delta I (SS-N-8) | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Yankee II (SS-N-17) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| SSBN-X (SS-N-17) | 1 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 15 | 17 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 |
| Yankee I (SS-N-6) | 22 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 13 | 11 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hotel III (SS-N-8) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Hotel II (SS-N-5) | 6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Golf III (SS-N-8) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Golf IV (SS-N-6) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 70 | 70 | 70 | 69 | 68 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 |

PROJECTED U.S. SSB INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| SSNB class (SLBM type) | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| Lafayette | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 30 | 25 | 20 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 1 | |
| Poseidon | (19) | (19) | (19) | (19) | (18) | (13) | (8) | (13) | (12) | (12) | (11) | (9) | (7) | (5) | (3) | (1) | |
| Trident I | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (11) | (9) | (7) | (5) | (3) | (1) | |
| Ohio | 2 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | |
| Trident I | (2) | (3) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (9) | (11) | (13) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | |
| Trident II | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | |
| Total | 33 | 34 | 36 | 37 | 37 | 34 | 31 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 23 | |

PROJECTED SOVIET SLBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| SLBM designation (SSB/SSBN class) | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| SS-N-20 (Typhoon) | 20 | 60 | 100 | 140 | 140 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 |
| SS-N-18 (Delta II) | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 240 |
| SS-N-17 (Delta I) | 28 | 60 | 92 | 124 | 156 | 188 | 220 | 252 | 284 | 316 | 348 | 364 | 364 | 364 | 364 | 364 |
| SS-N-16 (Delta I) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) |
| Yankee II | (116) | (48) | (80) | (112) | (144) | (176) | (208) | (240) | (272) | (304) | (336) | (352) | (352) | (352) | (352) | (352) |
| SSBN-X | 292 | 292 | 292 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 |
| SS-N-8 | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) | (64) |
| Delta II | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) | (216) |
| Delta I | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) |
| Hotel II | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) |
| Hotel III | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) |
| Golf III | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) |
| SS-N-6 | 352 | 320 | 288 | 256 | 208 | 176 | 144 | 112 | 80 | 48 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| (Yankee I) | (352) | (320) | (288) | (256) | (208) | (176) | (144) | (112) | (80) | (48) | (16) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| (Golf IV) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| SS-N-5 (Hotel II) | 18 | 12 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 950 | 984 | 1,018 | 1,046 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 |

PROJECTED U.S. SLBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| SLBM designation (SSBN class) | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| Trident I | 240 | 264 | 312 | 336 | 360 | 408 | 456 | 504 | 552 | 576 | 584 | 576 | 568 | 560 | 552 | 544 |
| Ohio | (48) | (72) | (120) | (144) | (168) | (216) | (264) | (312) | (360) | (384) | (408) | (432) | (456) | (480) | (504) | (528) |
| Lafayette | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (192) | (176) | (144) | (112) | (80) | (48) | (16) |
| Poseidon | 304 | 304 | 304 | 304 | 288 | 208 | 128 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lafayette | (304) | (304) | (304) | (304) | (288) | (208) | (128) | (48) | (16) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Total | 544 | 568 | 616 | 640 | 648 | 616 | 584 | 552 | 568 | 576 | 584 | 576 | 568 | 560 | 552 | 544 |

PROJECTED SOVIET REENTRY VEHICLE INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ICBM's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-18 (10 RV) | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-18 (8 RV) | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,360 | 720 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-19 (6 RV) | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,380 | 900 | 420 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-17 (4 RV) | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 440 | 120 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-18 (1 RV) | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 |
| SS-19 (1 RV) | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| SS-17 (1 RV) | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| SS-13 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| SS-11 | 518 | 518 | 468 | 418 | 368 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-X | 0 | 0 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 280 | 360 | 440 | 520 | 600 | 680 | 760 | 840 | 920 | 1,000 | 1,020 |
| Subtotal | 5,158 | 5,158 | 5,158 | 5,158 | 5,158 | 4,130 | 3,570 | 3,010 | 2,590 | 2,190 | 1,790 | 1,410 | 1,170 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |
| SLBM's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-N-20 | 200 | 600 | 1,000 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 |
| SS-N-18 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 | 1,680 |
| SS-N-17 | 20 | 60 | 92 | 124 | 156 | 188 | 220 | 252 | 284 | 316 | 348 | 364 | 364 | 364 | 364 | 364 |
| SS-N-8 | 292 | 292 | 292 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 |
| SS-N-6 | 352 | 320 | 288 | 256 | 224 | 192 | 160 | 128 | 96 | 64 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-N-5 | 18 | 12 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 2,562 | 2,964 | 3,358 | 3,746 | 3,730 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 | 3,930 |
| Grand Total | 7,720 | 8,122 | 8,516 | 8,904 | 8,888 | 8,060 | 7,500 | 6,940 | 6,520 | 6,120 | 5,720 | 5,340 | 5,100 | 5,010 | 5,010 | 5,010 |

PROJECTED U.S. DEPLOYED REENTRY VEHICLE INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| ICBM/SLBM designation | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| ICBM's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Minuteman III (MX-12A) | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 660 | 420 | 180 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Minuteman III (MX-12) | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 690 | 450 | 210 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Minuteman II | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| Titan II | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 45 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MX-2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 34 | 80 | 160 | 240 | 320 | 400 | 480 | 560 | 630 | 630 |
| Subtotal | 2,152 | 2,152 | 2,152 | 2,152 | 2,152 | 2,152 | 2,180 | 2,020 | 1,860 | 1,700 | 1,540 | 1,380 | 1,220 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |
| SLBM's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trident I | 1,920 | 2,112 | 2,496 | 2,880 | 2,880 | 3,264 | 3,648 | 4,032 | 4,424 | 4,608 | 4,672 | 4,608 | 4,544 | 4,480 | 4,416 | 4,352 |
| Poseidon | 2,736 | 2,736 | 2,736 | 2,736 | 2,592 | 1,872 | 1,152 | 432 | 144 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 4,656 | 4,848 | 5,232 | 5,616 | 5,472 | 5,136 | 4,800 | 4,464 | 4,568 | 4,608 | 4,672 | 4,608 | 4,544 | 4,480 | 4,416 | 4,352 |
| Grand Total | 6,808 | 7,000 | 7,384 | 7,752 | 7,624 | 7,288 | 6,982 | 6,584 | 6,588 | 6,468 | 6,372 | 6,148 | 5,924 | 5,700 | 5,496 | 5,432 |

PROJECTED SOVIET AGGREGATE STRATEGIC LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| Launcher type | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| ICBM's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-18 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,398 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |
| SS-19 | 990 | 990 | 990 | 990 | 990 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 | 1,050 |
| Bombers | 156 | 156 | 148 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| Total | 2,504 | 2,538 | 2,564 | 2,564 | 2,568 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 |
| Of which the following are counted as MIRV'd ballistic missiles and cruise missile-launching bombers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ICBM's | 820 | 820 | 820 | 820 | 820 | 740 | 660 | 580 | 500 | 420 | 340 | 260 | 180 | 100 | 20 | 0 |
| SLBM's | 260 | 300 | 300 | 380 | 380 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| Bombers | 0 | 0 | 5 | 30 | 60 | 90 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| Subtotal | 1,080 | 1,120 | 1,165 | 1,230 | 1,260 | 1,230 | 1,180 | 1,100 | 1,020 | 940 | 860 | 780 | 700 | 620 | 540 | 520 |

PROJECTED U.S. AGGREGATE STRATEGIC LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| Launcher type | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| ICBM's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-18 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,052 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |
| SS-19 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
| Bombers | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 | 345 |
| Total | 1,941 | 1,965 | 2,013 | 2,037 | 2,045 | 2,013 | 1,981 | 1,977 | 1,973 | 1,971 | 1,969 | 1,951 | 1,938 | 1,895 | 1,851 | 1,824 |
| Of which the following are counted as MIRV'd ballistic missiles and cruise missile-launching bombers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ICBM's | 590 | 590 | 590 | 590 | 590 | 590 | 590 | 590 | 590 | 470 | 390 | 310 | 230 | 150 | 70 | 0 |
| SLBM's | 544 | 568 | 568 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 568 | 576 | 584 | 576 | 568 | 560 | 544 |
| Bombers | 16 | 51 | 86 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 115 | 109 | 103 |
| Subtotal | 1,110 | 1,169 | 1,252 | 1,310 | 1,318 | 1,286 | 1,254 | 1,222 | 1,158 | 1,086 | 1,014 | 926 | 833 | 739 | 655 | 644 |

PROJECTED SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COUNTERFORCE—CAPABLE RV INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START (CLOSING THE "WINDOW OF ICBM VULNERABILITY")

| | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| Soviet: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-18 (10 RV's) | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-18 (8 RV's) | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,360 | 720 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SS-19 (6 RV's) | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,800 | 1,380 | 900 | 420 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,950 | 3,160 | 2,520 | 1,880 | 1,380 | 900 | 420 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| United States: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Minuteman III (MX-12A) | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 660 | 420 | 180 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Minuteman III (MX-12) | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 750 | 690 | 450 | 210 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,650 | 1,410 | 1,170 | 930 | 690 | 450 | 210 | 0 | 0 |
| Strike Ratio * (RV's/ICBM's): | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Soviet | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 2.99 | 2.40 | 1.74 | 1.28 | 0.83 | 0.39 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| United States | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.53 | 1.53 | 1.53 | 1.31 | 1.08 | 0.91 | 0.64 | 0.42 | 0.19 | 0 | 0 |

* The RV's carried by the MIRV'd version of the SS-17 are not included. Currently, the MIRV'd SS-17 does not have sufficient accuracy to destroy U.S. ICBM silos with a high degree of probability.

* Assuming 100-percent availability and reliability of the missiles and warheads (an optimistic assumption), 1 strike ratio equal to or larger than 2 denotes a theoretical capability to target at least 2 reentry vehicles against each silo. Thus, if each of the reentry vehicles has a high single-shot-kill probability (SSKP), a strike ratio equal to or larger than 2 signifies a theoretical capability to destroy the opposing ICBM force at their silos.

PROJECTED SOVIET STRATEGIC BOMBER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| Bomber designation | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| TU-95 Bear | 113 | 113 | 100 | 90 | 60 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ba-4 Bison | 43 | 43 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bu-X SWL | 0 | 0 | 5 | 30 | 60 | 90 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| Total | 156 | 156 | 148 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |

March 22, 1982

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

PROJECTED SOVIET DEPLOYED BOMBER WEAPON INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| Bomber and weapon designation | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| TU-95 Bear: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kangaroo Bombs | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 60 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Mya-4 Bison Bombs | 152 | 152 | 100 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| TU-16 SWL Bombs's | 85 | 85 | 86 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| ALCM's | 0 | 0 | 60 | 360 | 270 | 1,080 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,440 | |
| Bomb's | 0 | 0 | 20 | 120 | 240 | 360 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | 480 | |
| Totals | 313 | 313 | 341 | 615 | 1,020 | 1,470 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | |

PROJECTED U.S. DEPLOYED BOMBER WEAPON INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

| Bomber and weapon designation | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| B-52D: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRAM's | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 92 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Bombs | 304 | 304 | 304 | 304 | 304 | 184 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| B-57G: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRAM's | 628 | 488 | 348 | 212 | 212 | 212 | 212 | 156 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Bombs | 628 | 488 | 348 | 212 | 212 | 212 | 212 | 156 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| B-52H: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRAM's | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 264 | 144 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Bombs | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 384 | 264 | 144 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| B-52G CMC: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRAM's | 64 | 204 | 344 | 480 | 306 | 132 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Bombs | 64 | 204 | 344 | 480 | 306 | 132 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| ALCM's | 192 | 612 | 1,032 | 1,440 | 1,788 | 2,136 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400 | 1,800 | 1,080 | 360 | 0 | |
| B-1B: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRAM's | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 240 | 480 | 720 | 800 | 800 | 800 | 800 | 608 | 368 | 128 | 0 | |
| Bombs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 | 240 | 360 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 304 | 184 | 64 | 0 | |
| B-1B CMC: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ALCM's | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 600 | 1,320 | 2,040 | 2,400 | |
| Stealth: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRAM's | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 72 | 232 | 392 | 552 | 712 | 800 | 800 | 800 | |
| Bomb's | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 116 | 196 | 276 | 356 | 400 | 400 | 400 | |
| Total | 2,800 | 3,210 | 3,640 | 4,048 | 4,048 | 4,228 | 4,408 | 4,560 | 4,776 | 4,476 | 4,476 | 4,476 | 4,380 | 4,152 | 3,792 | 3,600 | |

PROJECTED AGGREGATE OF DEPLOYED SOVIET STRATEGIC WARHEADS UNDER PROPOSED START

| Delivery system | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| ICBM's/SLBM's | 7,720 | 8,122 | 8,516 | 8,904 | 8,888 | 8,960 | 7,500 | 6,940 | 6,520 | 6,120 | 5,720 | 5,340 | 5,100 | 5,010 | 5,010 | 5,010 |
| Bombers | 313 | 313 | 341 | 615 | 1,020 | 1,470 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 | 1,920 |
| Totals | 8,033 | 8,435 | 8,857 | 9,519 | 9,908 | 9,530 | 9,420 | 8,860 | 8,440 | 8,040 | 7,640 | 7,260 | 7,020 | 6,930 | 6,930 | 6,930 |

PROJECTED AGGREGATE OF DEPLOYED U.S. STRATEGIC WARHEADS UNDER PROPOSED START

| Delivery system | By end of calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| ICBM's/SLBM's | 6,808 | 7,000 | 7,384 | 7,576 | 7,624 | 7,288 | 6,952 | 6,644 | 6,588 | 6,468 | 6,372 | 6,148 | 5,924 | 5,700 | 5,496 | 5,432 |
| Bombers | 2,800 | 3,210 | 3,640 | 4,048 | 4,048 | 4,228 | 4,408 | 4,560 | 4,776 | 4,476 | 4,476 | 4,476 | 4,380 | 4,152 | 3,792 | 3,600 |
| Totals | 9,608 | 10,210 | 11,024 | 11,624 | 11,672 | 11,516 | 11,360 | 11,204 | 11,364 | 10,944 | 10,848 | 10,624 | 10,304 | 9,852 | 9,288 | 9,032 |

PROJECTED SOVIET STRATEGIC LAUNCHER RETIREMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

| Launcher | During calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Totals |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| ICBM's: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-11..... | 0 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 368 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 518 |
| SS-18 MIRV'd..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |
| SS-19 MIRV'd..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 80 | 80 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 |
| SS-17 MIRV'd..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 80 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| SS-18 single..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 8 | 0 | 58 |
| SS-19 single..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 60 |
| SS-17 single..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 20 | 32 |
| Subtotal..... | 0 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 448 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 20 | 1,338 |
| SLBM's: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-N-3 (Golf III)..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| SS-N-6 (Yankee II)..... | 48 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 48 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 400 |
| SS-N-5 (Hotel II)..... | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| Subtotal..... | 48 | 38 | 38 | 44 | 48 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 424 |
| Bombers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TU-95 Bear..... | 0 | 0 | 13 | 10 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 113 |
| Mya-4 Bison..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 43 |
| Subtotal..... | 0 | 0 | 13 | 53 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 156 |
| Grand Total..... | 48 | 38 | 101 | 147 | 128 | 510 | 142 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 96 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 20 | 1,918 |

PROJECTED SOVIET STRATEGIC LAUNCHER NEW DEPLOYMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

| Launcher | During calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Totals |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| ICBM's: SS-X subtotal | 0 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 130 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 20 | 1,020 |
| SLBM's: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SS-N-20 (Typhoon) | 20 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 160 |
| SS-N-18 (Delta III) | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 |
| SS-N-17 (SSBN-X) | 16 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 352 |
| Subtotal | 52 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 32 | 32 | 52 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 528 |
| Bombers: TU-X SWL (subtotal) | 0 | 0 | 5 | 25 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 170 |
| Grand total | 52 | 72 | 127 | 147 | 112 | 192 | 162 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 96 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 20 | 1,668 |

PROJECTED U.S. STRATEGIC LAUNCHER RETIREMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

| Launcher | During calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Totals |
|------------------------|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| ICBM's: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Minuteman III (MX-12A) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 300 |
| Minuteman III (MX-12) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 250 |
| Titan II | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 27 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 52 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 27 | 18 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 70 | 0 | 602 |
| SLBM's: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poseidon (Lafayette) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 304 |
| Trident I (Lafayette) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 176 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 32 | 16 | 16 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 480 |
| Bombers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| B-52D | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 76 |
| B-52G | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 36 | 36 | 18 | 173 |
| B-52H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 96 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 36 | 33 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 18 | 345 |
| Grand total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 117 | 137 | 134 | 145 | 126 | 126 | 142 | 148 | 148 | 138 | 50 | 1,427 |

PROJECTED U.S. STRATEGIC LAUNCHER NEW DEPLOYMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

| Launcher | During calendar year— | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Totals |
|---|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
| ICBM's: MX-2 (subtotal) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 27 | 46 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 70 | 0 | 630 |
| SLBM's: Trident I (Ohio class) (subtotal) | 24 | 24 | 48 | 24 | 24 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 504 |
| Bombers: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| B-1B | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Stealth | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 200 |
| Grand total | 24 | 24 | 48 | 24 | 24 | 85 | 105 | 124 | 147 | 124 | 124 | 124 | 124 | 115 | 94 | 24 | 1,334 |